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devoir abandonner leur enfant. Qu'advenait-il si elles changeaient de position, si 
elles laissaient le service domestique? Les travailleurs sociaux proposaient l'adop-
tion mais, bien avant, de nombreuses mères, incapables de garder leurs enfants, les 
confiaient déjà à des parents adoptifs soit de façon formelle ou informelle. 
Notons enfin que cet excellent ouvrage est complété par une impressionnante 
bibliographie sur les mères célibataires et sur le travail social aux États-Unis. Une 
telle étude est très pertinente à la recherche qui se poursuit présentement au Québec 
sur l'histoire des professions féminines comme la diététique et la physiothérapie 
(Fahmy-Eid et Charles), la phannacologie (Colin) le nursing (Petitat, Daigle, 
Cohen), et le travail social (Groulx). 
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Craig M. Cameron- American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of 
Battle in the First Marine Division, /941-1951. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994. Pp. xiii, 297. 
Sorne wars approach the abstraction of total violence nearer than others. According 
to Craig M. Cameron, this is not because, as Karl von Clausewitz intimated, organ-
ized violence enervates the natural but unpredictable, uncontrollable force of human 
hatred. Rather, he argues, hatred is readily manufactured for war by the societies 
and organizations that wage it, largely through the manipulation of abstract images. 
This imparts an "interactive and integrative" quality to the Clausewitzian model 
whereby seemingly rational decisions affect and are affected by myth and imagina-
tion (p. 6). What the men of the First Marine Division thought about themselves, 
their enemy, and the world around them affected profoundly the character of the 
Pacifie war. Its barbarity was driven by the mental images they carried into battle. 
These were many years in the making. Long before Guadalcanal, their military 
experience and American popular culture had led Marines to think of themselves 
as an elite military group defending American democracy. Their unique amphibious 
warfare doctrine seemed proof of this. An exalted self-portrait led easily to a view 
of themselves as the country's warrior representatives, ''a kind of American samurai 
class" (p. 30). Hollywood bolstered these myths, while inter-war colonial occupa-
tion dulies imparted or solidi.fied racial stereotypes. Historical experience and 
popular mythology, however, were not enough. The Marine persona was carefulJy 
cultivated by the Corps itself through rigorous training and indoctrination in the 
"hypermasculine" ideals of a rigidly hierarchical military structure. The crude 
objectification of women, which most initiales accepted wholeheartedly, was a 
crucial aspect of this process. For the Marine, one officer remembered, ''the Corps 
[was] his religion" (p. 63). 
The conduct of the Pacifie war was also affected by Marine images of their 
enemy, the Japanese, and of their primary inter-service rival, the Anny. Of the two, 
the former was certainly the most important, although the latter's effect on tactical 
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operations was often equally significant. The outgrowths of institutional uniqueness 
included over-confidence and recklessness, leading to high casualties and the early 
death of the "old" Marine Corps spirit (p. 138). Marine images of the Japanese 
"drew upon a deeply ingrained racist ideology that has characterized America's 
expansion since the earliest colonial times" (p. 89). AJthough the precise nature of 
such images varied, the Japanese "other" was essential in maintaining the will to 
fight and in determining the outcome of conflict. This was equally true for the 
Japanese. Such assumptions resulted in the horrible fonns of combat and punish-
ment documented in John Dower's War Without Mercy (1986). According to 
Cameron, Marines exhibited "the same savage responses in battJe as their enemy" 
(p. 126). 
The creation and use of myth and identity moved the First Marine Division a 
long way towards what Cameron repeatedly describes as an exterminationist phi-
losophy of violence, one which he suggests resembled closely that of Hitler's 
Wehnnacht on the Russian front. By the Okinawa campaign in 1945, American 
technological dominance offered the prospect of fulfilling such totalitarian dreams, 
or, as he puts it, validating Marine ideology (p. 166). The death of the old Corps 
had robbed the institution of its distinctiveness- it was now functionally the same 
as the Anny- but its ideological uniqueness and sense of self remained along with 
a "rationalized, systematized application of violence" (p. 172). 
Su ch images collapsed within six months of the Korean war' s outbreak. in 1950, 
largely due to the changing nature of war itself and the new international system 
in which it occurred (p. 203). ln addition, American society's commemoration of 
World War II, in its iconography, for example, helped purge wartime images of 
their rougher hues in a successful effort to reintegrate returning veterans. The 
brutalization of the Pacifie war could not have provided a sound basis for post-war 
rehabilitation (p. 265). 
Certainly, prevailing images of the Japanese, of themselves, and of other groups 
helped determine the nature and outcome of the First Marine Division's battles, and 
certainly this phenomenon bas been far Jess frequentJy studied than doctrine or 
personality. But Cameron's analysis is prone to sweeping generalizations not sup-
ported firmi y enough by the evidence provided. His assessment of racism is perhaps 
the best example. The barbarism, long recognized by scholars and remembered by 
participants, that marked the Pacifie campaign was due in part to doctored Marine 
images of the enemy, but it was also due to differences of culture and ideology that 
were, for a time at !east, perceived to be irreconcilable by the principals involved. 
To label such conflicts "racism" is surely to rob that term of meaning, despite the 
manipulation of differences by the respective national war machines and the horrifie 
consequences that ensued. 
Fixation on American racism and its military effects Jeads Cameron down severa! 
dirnly Lit roads in pursuit of moral equivalents. Sorne scholars will surely bristle at 
the suggestion that the First Marine Division practised an exterrninationist policy, 
or thal Marines in general probably violated the rules of war as frequently or as 
wantonly as their Japanese opponents, which the Okinawa chapter clearly implies. 
Even given the orgy of violence that engulfed the Pacifie in the final year of war, 
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both contentions are dubious at best, Dower's ground-breaking study notwithstand-
ing. As weil, many of the racist "myths" Cameron discusses regarding Marine 
views of Japanese conduct (their ferocity and tenacity in battJe, for example) were, 
in fact, true, just as many Japanese depictions of American excesses (their racist 
treatment of blacks and Japanese-Americans, for example) were brutally accurate. 
It is weil that self-satisfying, sanctimonious images of American military conduct 
be d..ispelled, but not that they be replaced by equally tenuous myths. In the same 
category is the constant comparison of Marine actions with those of the German 
Army in Russia, inspired entirely by Omer Bartov's controversial work on that 
subject. Cameron here stretches a useful point, the need for re-evaluation and 
comparative sensitivity, into an absurdity. 
Cameron's conclusion, that the war is constantly being "rewritten" by Americans 
to serve specifie or societal needs as the occasion demands, is mildly provocative, 
but too elever by half. While rightly dismissing Paul Fussell's tawdry ind..ictment 
of the mass of war literature, Cameron proceeds to reduce the same material to 
motivated myth-making, what he caUs "historical cleansing" (p. 265). Literature 
is rarely so purposive, although the changing patterns of historical interpretation are 
surely self-evident. Enlightenment and perspective never emerge full-blown in the 
. wake of events. Why should Cameron think otherwise? If so, there would be no 
need for and no such thing as historiography, a field which, not surprisingly, 
Cameron often treats with unbecoming (and undeserved) disdain. 
Only the most d..isinterested reader will fail to be challenged by American Sam-
urai. For this reason alone, Cameron is to be commended and, one hopes, widely 
read. In understand..ing human motivation and the nature of combat in the First 
Marine Division, we are now forced to consider self-image, gender, and institutional 
myth-making, among other things, as determinants of military outcomes. This is a 
useful and overdue caution, and on this leve! the book clearly succeeds. In making 
a broader, revisionist case, however, the kind his introduction implies will be 
avoided, Cameron is far Jess convincing, if only because of frequent resort to 
intemperate generalization. 
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Olive P. Dickason- Le mythe du sauvage, traduit de l'anglais par Jude des Chê-
nes, Québec, Éditions du Septentrion, 1993, 451 p. 
Neuf ans après la parution du texte anglais, la traduction française du livre d'Olive 
P. Dickason nous donne une nouvelle chance d'apprécier à sa juste valeur l'érudi-
tion et la créativité dont celle-ci a fait preuve dans le traitement de son sujet. Ce qui 
nous vient à l'esprit en la relisant, c'est combien la connaissance de notre propre 
héritage intellectuel demeure essentielle pour comprendre la vision des habitants du 
Nouveau Monde qu'avaient les Occidentaux à l'époque et que, jusqu'à un certain 
